Red Sun Rising: A Cambodian Tale of the Third

A part of World War III in this fictional universe that are not in the main book.

The Beginning

Cambodia’s choice for a close economic and political relationship with PR China ever since the end of it’s civil war in 1990s had brought a much needed reconstruction and economic progress. Fueled by a young population bouncing back from the days of the Khmer Rouge, the country’s recovery was even called a mini-equivalent of China’s own “reform and opening up” and the neighboring Vietnam’s “Doi Moi” reform. Furthermore, China’s cultivation of Cambodia as an ally, which in it’s modern form was actually dated back to the latter’s independence in 1958, also served the latter a purpose of creating a counterweight against influences of Thailand and Vietnam in the Mainland South East Asia.

One of it’s primary implication was that even before the 2020s, the country took multiple pro-China stance within international organizations, such as in the United Nations as well as in ASEAN, especially in multiple diplomatic actions that aimed to address sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea - one of the primary powder kegs of the subsequent war in 2025. Meanwhile in the economic development sphere, the embrace of Belt and Road Initiative and free trade agreement further cemented the country’s majority position in the Cambodian economy.

Amid China’s escalating military assertiveness, pushbacks from the United States, its allies, and even politically non-aligned nations in Asia and Latin America intensified, while varied in it’s intensity depend on each country. Beginning in the mid-2010s, successive rounds of tightened trade barriers sought to contain Beijing’s economic influence. In response, Cambodia alongside Laos, Venezuela, and North Korea emerged as crucial hubs for Chinese manufacturers’ offshore production alongside several non-aligned nations, serving as a conduit to bypass Western-imposed restrictions and maintain market access.

The increased military assertiveness and industrial capability is a segue to another element of Cambodian alignment towards China, it’s defense. Even long before the “Asian NATO” IPSDC (Indo-Pacific Strategic Defense Coalition) was on the table, Chinese technology and manufacturing had brought a substantial modernization of Cambodia’s security system, from law enforcement and civil protection, to it’s Royal Armed Forces (RCAF), further helped by it’s relative social stability and lack of insurgency problems compared to other pro-China members of ASEAN, particularly Myanmar.

A story of the Third

Overview

The land force component of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces; the Royal Cambodian Army or Kang Toap Cheung Kouk - lit. “Land Forces”; was primarily organized using military region system, in which the country is divided into six. Initially every military region was a division size echelon with a Major General in command, however in commensurate with the country’s increased economic wealth, the Army and the Royal Armed Forces followed suit in force strength and capability. Following the tone of People’s Liberation Army’s military reform in the mid 2010s, Cambodian Army military regions were made similar to a PLAGF Group Army - a corps equivalent - in echelon, despite challenges brought by the COVID pandemic in early 2020s. However unlike the Chinese, the Cambodian military regions post reform were led by lieutenant generals with major generals as their chief of staff.

Another difference of the Cambodian and the Chinese is integration of combat oriented combined arms brigades and territorial forces, along with assortment of support and training commands, as well as border infantry battalions deployed in it’s international borders with Thailand, Vietnam and Laos. This arrangement was similar to it’s neighboring Thailand; whose Army Areas include combat-centric Army Corps and regional military districts (called military circles). Additionally, Cambodian land force in general did not possess manned aviation capability, which solely rested under the aegis of the Royal Cambodian Air Force.

One of the military regions of Cambodian Army is the Third Military Region, formed as part of the second iteration of the Royal Armed Forces and it’s constituent branches in 1993. The command was headquartered in Kampong Speu and the region covered the provinces of Kampong Speu, Takéo, Kampot, Sihanoukville, Koh Kong and Kep. Previously during the days of short-lived Khmer Republic, the command was designated as 2nd Military Region.

Order of Battle (ORBAT) of Cambodian Third Military Region at the eve of World War III

The command was structured as following:

1. Combat Forces or Main Force. It’s composition was as follows:

   a. 3rd Heavy Combined Arms Brigade, heavy armored brigade with ZBD-04 infantry fighting vehicles and VT4 main battle tanks - an export model using subsystems from ZTZ-96B and ZTZ-99/99A used by the PLAGF.

   b. 3rd and 30th Medium Combined Arms Brigade, medium mechanized brigade, previously called “Mobile Reinforcement Units”. Equipped with VN1 export variant of the ZBL-09 8x8 wheeled amphibious armored vehicle family locally assembled in Cambodia.

   c. 3rd Light Combined Arms Brigade, light high-mobility infantry brigade with Dongfeng EQ2050/Mengshi infantry mobility vehicle and locally-produced VP11 mine-resistant armored vehicle (MRAP) with soft-skinned Chinese, Russian, Japanese and European (particularly German) trucks in support role.

   d. 3rd Artillery and Air Defense Brigade, military region-level heavy artillery and air defense unit supporting maneuver brigades, with two artillery battalions using towed PLL-01 155mm howitzers, one heavy MLRS battalion with PHL-03, and two air defense battalions, equipped with combination of LY-80 (HQ-16; a derivative of Russian Buk), PG-90 35mm towed anti-aircraft gun system, and even anti-UAV machine guns and electronic-based systems.

   e. 3rd Commando Battalion. Unlike most of the Cambodian Army who blended French tradition and Chinese military organizations, Commando Battalions in the Cambodian Army were inspired from the Indonesian Army “Raider” Battalions, similar to it’s strategic-level, red-beret wearing “Special Forces Command” (Formerly 911th SF Regiment), who was trained by Indonesian Army Special Forces - the Kopassus.

2. Military Operation Zones, also called Territorial Forces, are provincial military headquarters similar in nature to Thai Army “military circles”. Their tasks: command and control, internal and rear area security, recruitment and conscription, reserve force, and military operations other than war/CIMIC duties coordinated by regional Headquarters Service unit. Usually a Military Operations Zone is a regiment with a single combat-capable, truck-mounted, security and civil protection battalion, however in case of the Third MR; its strategic Preah Sihanouk (Sihanoukville) Command is brigade-sized with three infantry and one light armored battalion with Chinese Type 63 light tanks.

3. Combat Support Forces, consist of an engineer brigade with its various specialty roles including unarmed construction and combat bridging units, a signal regiment, intelligence unit - with its own feared internal security role alongside intelligence element of the Gendarmerie, National Police and PM Office-subordinated General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and the Bodyguard HQ (the “BHQ”).

4. Service Support Forces, grouping the military region’s logistical support force (in form of a 3rd Support Brigade with battalions and detachments of transport, quartermaster, food service, POL, water, medical, and administration (finance, etc); a regional military hospital; and five static provincial level depots commensurate with the Military Operations Zones.

5. Other directly reporting units include four independent border defense battalions, equipped similarly to light infantry brigades, and a training command which handle training depots and ranges; the latter command is, however primarily answering to RCA’s Training and Doctrine Command.

6. Gendarmerie; True to its French tradition, it served a dual role as a militarized rural police force primarily by its provincial commands (while the khaki wearing-National Police largely operated in large urban centers and provincial capitals), as well to operate as riot police under aegis of Mobile Gendarmerie Division and military police duties as part of Provost Division for the Armed Forces as a whole.

War Chronicle (2025-2026)

The beginning

The People’s Liberation Army was officially allowed a broad presence in Cambodia in 2022 just as the world in large was focusing on COVID-19 vaccination effort. It’s strength is equivalent to Western Theater Command’s Military District - a unique formation smaller than a Theater Command but larger than a Group Army; designated as a “PLA Group of Forces in Cambodia” by Western intelligence. This, and similar arrangement in Laos while they allowed PLA presence in return of debt forgiveness, paved the way for many of it’s neighbors, including the newly democratized Vietnam, to band together alongside multiple NATO member nations and US-aligned East Asian countries to form the IPSDC.

At the start of World War III in 2025, the PLA's 3rd Military Region focused its efforts alongside Cambodian forces on a general offensive aimed at occupying Vietnam’s Mekong River Delta, followed by an eastward push toward Saigon (Ho Chi Minh City). Simultaneously, the region sought support the general blockade over the Gulf of Thailand to confine the bulk of Royal Thai Navy in it’s bases while defending the strategic port city of Sihanoukville from relentless Coalition air, missile, and drone strikes originating from land, sea, and Coalition forces in Thailand, Malaysia, and other IPSDC member states.

However, the difficult terrain, worsened by climate change-induced flooding, proved to be a formidable obstacle. Persistent inundation turned key supply routes into impassable swamps or mud, stranding mechanized and unmanned ground vehicle units and forcing infantry to navigate treacherous jungle paths. Vietnamese and other Coalition forces who managed to break through the Chinese Navy in the area exploited these difficulties with precision ambush tactics, targeting supply convoys and command centers. Additionally, intense drone operations and airstrikes from USS George Washington and French Charles de Gaulle CSG stationed around Indonesian and Singaporean territorial waters - with it’s own anti-ship missile and cruise missile batteries as part of Coalition-wide fortified island “Bastion” hubs - one of which is Indonesia’s Natuna Island - decimated key logistical hubs as far as Laos and occupied Thai territories. Any hesitation for withdrawal was gone with a successful missile strike from Virginia-class USS Tang (SSN-805) obliterated the headquarters of the PLA Group of Forces in Cambodia - reportedly thanks to intelligence from a mole within their ranks—delivering a devastating blow to its leadership. Despite immediate replacements, by October 2025, faced with mounting attrition and the growing necessity of defending Sihanoukville, the 3rd Military Region Main Force was forced into withdrawal, marking a significant setback for China's expansionist strategy in Southeast Asia. This retreat coincided with the commencement of IPSDC/NATO’s Southern Cambodia Offensive, which began with an assault on Sihanoukville’s island fortifications before linking up with armored forces advancing from Thailand, ultimately aiming to seize the port city and its surrounding areas, including the surrounding islands such as the infamous Koh Tang Island—site of the last battle of the Vietnam War.

Sihanoukville Islands Groupings

The collapsing coastal defense of Cambodia was further amplified by a destruction of a PLA Navy Cruiser-Destroyer group and it’s unmanned vessels companions, including it’s flagship LHD PLANS Hainan (31), a Type 075-class attempting to reinforce the Cambodians and resume the blockade of the Gulf. 3rd Military Region forces, especially the 3rd Light Brigade, 3rd Commandos, alongside elements of the Army’s Special Forces Command (“Red Berets”) —which their background of Indonesian training created a lethal "student vs teacher" moment—attempted to resupply and reinforce the islands in coordination with the Royal Cambodian Navy’s 31st Marine Brigade as well as it’s PLAN Marine Corps detachments deployed in the islands as well as the Autonomous Port and nearby Ream Naval Base.

At the same time, from their operational base in the occupied city of Battambang, the mechanized VII Multinational Corps (Southeast Asian), spearheaded by the 3rd Singapore Division and two armored divisions—both were considered elite and named the 2nd Cavalry Division from Thailand and Indonesia respectively—launched a rapid thrust into Koh Kong and Kampong Speu provinces; By 12 December, they reached their objectives within National Highway 4 and it’s adjacent expressway. That same day, the Coalition launched a massive barrage of ballistic and cruise missiles in combination with continuous use of attack drones and even tactical airpower, with notable hit include the main power plant supplying the capital Phnom Penh.

Meanwhile from the east, Vietnam seized the opportunity to launch an offensive despite ongoing battles along its northern and western borders with Laos; With equipment support from Europe, India and Southeast Asia, it deployed two divisions from it’s 4th Corps, formerly 4th Military Region; the 324th and 341st Mechanized Infantry Division, along with the element of the 4th Corps Artillery Brigade - towards the strategic city (formerly a town) of Kratie. This maneuver, reminiscent of Vietnam’s 1978 invasion, was designed to divert as many Cambodian and PLA troops away from Sihanoukville as possible. In tandem, another Vietnamese divisional task force, including marine units and “Dac Cong” (Sappers) special forces, executed a lightning assault to sever several key road connections between Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville, as well as to capture Sihanoukville Airport, located southeast of the city. The assault was bolstered by overwhelming air support, including French Navy Rafales operating from the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. The airport’s subsequent fall severed a critical resupply point for the PLA and Cambodian forces and facilitated a critical junction with U.S. Marines and Singapore Guards who had conducted amphibious landings in the city of Kampot, securing yet another crucial supply route and fire control for the Coalition.

Both western and eastern portion of the Coalition offensive was reinforced by Cambodian opposition forces collectively known as the "Free Cambodian Army"—a paramilitary coalition secretly trained and equipped by Coalition special forces before the war. These resistance units launched coordinated sabotage operations targeting supply depots, command centers, and logistical routes, with provincial military operation zone of almost all military regions of Cambodia affected by the offensive bore the brunt of it, hence their engagement in both resistance against Coalition regular forces and counter-partisan operations against Cambodian opposition forces - even after their entire assigned province had fallen under Coalition occupation, with guerilla warfare and sabotage operations led and coordinated by both 3rd MR’s 3rd Commando Battalion and Army Special Forces, as well as PLASOF forces present in the area, which slowed down Coalition movement towards their objectives; to the point that the VII Multinational Corps high command were forced to deploy a portion of it’s infantry centric force - Royal Thai Army’s 6th Infantry Division, to assist pro Coalition Cambodian fighters in defending their rear, while the Singaporeans were forced to put one of it’s 3rd Division’s infantry brigade in the similar role.

From the sea, despite initial success in leveraging drones and RCN’s “Mosquito Fleet”; Chinese-made corvettes, fast attack craft, and midget submarines, Coalition forces—Malaysian, Thai, Vietnamese, Indonesian, and French marine landing troops still managed to overcome the island’s defenders. By August, additional Coalition naval assets arrived, beginning with a small surface action group led by Zumwalt-class destroyer USS Leahy (DDG-1005) as well as up to two additional Virginia class SSNs with Tomahawk and Anduril-type cruise missiles, followed by USS Fallujah Expeditionary Strike Group with it’s combined manned and unmanned escort, carrying based on USMC’s 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade with a battalion of heliborne Singapore Army Guards shock troopers joining the Americans.

The ensuing attrition from precision strikes and interdiction efforts by Coalition forces ultimately neutralized the previously mentioned reinforcement attempts, accelerating the broader collapse of Sihanoukville’s outer defenses; with Cambodian Navy’s 31st Marine Brigade fought almost to the last men.

Yet, the battle was far from over. The city and its surrounding metropolitan areas had been extensively prepared for prolonged resistance by both the 3rd Military Region’s Engineer Brigade and PLA engineering units. Additional labor, drawn from across surrounding provinces under the direction of the Cambodian Gendarmerie, was used to fortify Sihanoukville. Some workers were lured by promises of higher wages, while others—including prisoners and political detainees—were forced into labor under threat of imprisonment or execution. Residential districts, office buildings, and even casinos were converted into defensive bastions, with high-rises repurposed as sniper nests and command centers. Below ground, Sihanoukville Metro’s tunnel networks—another product of the BRI—were repurposed as bunkers, underground supply depots, and command centers, ensuring that the battle for Sihanoukville would be long and grueling.

Last Stand in Sihanoukville

On the late August 2025, the first shell from a Thai CAESAR artillery system struck Sihanoukville - the siege had officially began. Naval gunfire support from the Leahy and other surface vessels of the coalition taking their turn to reduce any identified defensive position of the city into ruins, while not without complications due to Cambodian and Chinese forces employed extensive use of decoys, mimicking air defense systems, artillery batteries, and supply depots to divert Coalition strikes.

In total, Cambodian and Chinese defenders could count up to 15,000 troops from various branches under arms within the city limits, alongside up to 10,000 to 15,000 more of its city inhabitants capable of bearing arms—Cambodians and Chinese expatriates alike. Many of these expatriates had prior military experience, having served in the PLA, Chinese security forces, or paramilitary units, making them a valuable auxiliary force in the city's defense, while others with link to the state-backed enterprises or security contractors, had undergone paramilitary training before the war, further enhancing their combat effectiveness. Furthermore, Chinese companies operating in Sihanoukville - and Cambodia in general - had clandestinely facilitated militia-style training, ostensibly for security purposes, with backing from Cambodia’s Ministries of National Defense and Interior. These paramilitary groups, feared by locals as enforcers for criminal syndicates pre-war, were quickly repurposed into auxiliary forces for the city’s defense.

The assault on Sihanoukville itself commenced with a coordinated landing of unmanned ground systems, supported by airstrikes from both manned and unmanned aerial assets. Targeting the Autonomous Port and its surrounding infrastructure, the operation aimed to establish a beachhead and secure a corridor for both air-drop and sea resupply. The subsequent amphibious operation was led by the American 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, alongside survivors of the island landing forces and additional heliborne troops of Malaysia’s 10th Parachute Brigade led the way, further joined by low-level parachute drop by task forces of French 11th Parachute Brigade. Contributing to the Cambodian and Chinese resistance was a portion - the Independent Battalion 9001 - of the Sihanoukville Military Operations Zone, alongside survivors of the 3rd MR’s 30th Medium, 3rd Light Brigade, surviving artillery crews, RCN sailors, and RCAF airmen repurposed as infantry, as well as unmanned systems which had not yet been jammed, hacked, or destroyed.

An attempt of relief was executed by elements of the PLA Group of Forces outside the city, codenamed Operation Friendship Assistance 01, with three brigades including two heavy (armored) combined arms brigades alongside Cambodian troops, including it’s Brigade 70—an elite heavy brigade originally established as a regime security force and tasked with the defense of Phnom Penh. Directly led by the Group of Forces commander, Lieutenant General Xi Anhui, the force managed to reach two national parks at the border of Sihanoukville Province - Preah Monivong Bokor and Kirirom, only to be ambushed and halted by, among other things, sabotage from Free Cambodian forces in it’s rear, even inside Phnom Penh itself. On the other hand, in small groups and risking retributions from their commanders, elements from various units of the military Region and some cooperative PLA soldiers did manage to break out from the city during that time, often at night, despite extensive Coalition drone surveillance.

The attempted relief was also later used as a bargaining chip for multiple round of humanitarian ceasefires on November and December that year, which allowed as many as 20.000 of Sihanoukville’s inhabitants to leave for Phnom Penh or towards Coalition occupied areas west of the country.

Furthermore, as Coalition marine, air assault and mechanized forces were pushing further into the city center, PLA and Cambodian forces, entrenched within the city, extensively utilized it’s pre-prepared tunnel network, fortified sniper nests and anti-tank positions, autonomous weaponry, and buildings - even Chinese-owned casinos - rigged with explosives to delay the Coalition offensive. Eventually on late January, 2026, the defenders had been pushed further into their last fortified areas; including the city’s Chinatown district. To the horror of the Coalition forces, they discovered that Chinese criminal elements and casino owners had often armed their enslaved workers as expendable troops or even used them as unarmed couriers and ammunition bearers. Some of these coerced combatants were found wearing makeshift uniforms and sent into battle with little to no training, their presence a grim testament to the desperation of the city's defenders. Such intertwining of the city’s resistance and Chinese-sponsored organized crime that the overall ground force commander of the siege, ex officio commander of VII Multinational Corps, Lieutenant General Henry Wu, Singapore Army, at one point considered enacting an order for “shoot on sight” for any such militias unless they surrendered.

Surrender and Aftermath

On 9 March 2026, the Coalition launched its final offensive as reinforcements, primarily from Vietnam, arrived to join the attacking force, which also brought additional unmanned systems within it; as tunnels and buildings and even formerly upscale housing continued to be cleared, one by one. The PLAAF and their Cambodian allies intensified airstrikes in response, alongside Ground Forces’ engagement of it’s long-range rocket artillery, predominantly from Phnom Penh area. Despite the deteriorating situation of Sihanoukville, most of it’s government including the mayor refused to leave.

On late March, Coalition troops further divided the remaining of Cambodian and Chinese resistance into multiple pockets, with three largest ones within the city center and it’s central railway station linking it to Phnom Penh. On 1 May 2026. International Labour Day. The city’s mayor and surviving administrators dispatched multiple liaisons with Red Cross interlocuting for the final surrender negotiation, despite initial instruction from Cambodia’s central government and it’s ruling party for him not to do so. Not even Chinese effort to keep such negotiation for occurring a success. And so, under a flag of parley, a deal of surrender finally ended the active phase of fighting at May 9.

Nevertheless, mop up operation continues even after the official pronouncement of the city’s taking which took place at the next day. Further IPSDC/NATO information control means that the news were only officially released beginning at May 15.

Third Military Region officially ceased to exist with the fall of Sihanoukville. 2.500 of it’s surrendering personnel including two generals switched sides to the opposition, joining Coalition-formed National Guard of Cambodia, it’s story coming soon, while others were either in captivity within South East Asia, or managed to break out and reach to Phnom Penh and it’s surrounding areas to assist in it’s defense. With heavy cost of the siege, the Coalition was forced to invest more in further stabilization of occupied areas before it can proceed for the main objective of the offensive - the capital Phnom Penh.